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WHEN THE LEVEE BREAKS: CLIMATE CHANGE, RISING SEAS, AND
THE Loss OF ISLAND NATION STATEHOOD
BEN JUVELIER*
Climate change is causing and will continue to cause unprecedented changes for
humanity. These changes will disproportionately impact small island and atoll states
like Kiribati and the Maldives. Both states are vulnerable to climate change due to
a combination of low average elevation, lack of sustainable groundwater, and
economic dependence on existing coastlines. By using the United Nations (UN)
Trusteeship system as a framework for enabling the continued international
relevance, the two deterritorialized nations can continue to provide for their
peoples. The traditional elements of statehood, first codified in the Montevideo
Convention of 1933, define "states" as entities with territory, a permanent
population, a government in control, and capacity for international relations. After
climate causes irreversible harm to these island states, neither will maintain their
status as a state under international law. UN Trusteeship is a mechanism which
directly addresses transitional entities that the international system does not define
as states. By using the existing mechanisms of international law contained in the UN
Charter, the international community can mitigate the effects of a climate change
crisis for its most vulnerable members.
I. INTRODUCTION
The tide washes over what was once home to tens of thousands of people in the
island country of Kiribati; remnants of the former capital Tarawa are visible at low
tide as the ruins emerge from beneath the sea. It may sound like science fiction, but
the facts of climate change are undeniable; the seas are rising, and bringing with
them untold difficulties for residents of small island states' dependent on oceans for
their survival.2 Ultimately, the prognosis for the denizens of these island nations -
* Ben Juvelier is a law fellow at the Public International Law and Policy Group, where he works
on questions of public international law, peace negotiations, and transitional justice. He holds a J.D. with
a focus in International Law from American University Washington College of Law and an M.A. in
International Affairs from American University School of International Service.
1. See, e.g., WILLIAM R. SLOMANSON, FUNDAMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
46 (6th ed. 2011) (comparing the term "state," used to refer to the governing political entity which is a
unit of international law, with the word "nation," which is used to describe a unified people with common
language, culture, and history).
2. See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK, ACTING ON CLIMATE CHANGE & DISASTER RISK FOR THE
PACIFIC (2013),
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such as the Maldives and Kiribati - is grim, but with enough preparation a crushing
humanitarian catastrophe may be avoided.' However, even in the best-case scenario
for the citizens of the Maldives and Kiribati, their governments will still face an
existential crisis.4 The question of existence for these states strikes at the core of the
international community's understanding of statehood.'
There is a presumption of continuity for states in the international system.6
Even when states are referred to as being "failed states," they are still unequivocally
referred to as members of the existing order of the international system.7 However,
these failed states are often examples of a government simply losing control of a
portion of its territory.' What happens when a government is disaggregated from its
territory - losing its territory completely - or the people controlled by a government
no longer reside on the state's physical territory?9 Kiribati and the Maldives are
facing this question as sea levels rise and climate change will render their territory
uninhabitable over the next century.'0
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/354821468098054153/pdfl80869ORevisedOOBox379874B
OOPUBLICO.pdf (analyzing, generally, the risks created by climate change for Pacific islands).
3. See Susin Park, Climate Change and the Risk of Statelessness: The Situation of Low-lying
Island States, UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, U.N. Doc. PPLA/2011/04 (May
2011) [hereinafter Park].
4. See, e.g., Justin Worland, Meet the President Trying to Save His Island Nation from Climate
Change, TIME (Oct. 9, 2015), http://time.com/4058851/kiribati-cliamte-change/ [hereinafter Worland]
("In Kiribati ... even a moderate rise [in sea level] could be catastrophic. And the island nation is also at
risk from an expected increase in the number of extreme weather events, such as storms and typhoons.")
5. See, e.g., LILIAN YAMAMOTO & MIGUEL ESTEBAN, ATOLL ISLAND STATES AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CLIMATE CHANGE DISPLACEMENT AND SOVEREIGNTY 1 (2014) [hereinafter
YAMAMOTO & ESTEBAN] (discussing the need to closely examine international legal principles in light
of the increasing threat of climate change); MICHAEL B. GERRARD & GREGORY WANNIER, THREATENED
ISLAND NATIONS: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF RISING SEAS AND A CHANGING CLIMATE 4 (2013)
[hereinafter GERRARD] ("One fundamental question that will affect these islands is what happens to the
nations themselves if their island territories become uninhabitable.")
6. See JANE MCADAM, 'Disappearing States, Statelessness, and the Boundaries ofInternational
Law, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 105, 111 (2010)
[hereinafter Disappearing States] (quoting JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 715 (2d ed. 2006)).
7. See, e.g., YAMAMOTO & ESTEBAN, supra note 5, at 208 (suggesting that the case of Somalia as
a 'government in exile' is one in which the international system still supports the government as a State).
8. See id. ("The difference between an Atoll Island State whose territory disappeared and a
government-in-exile is that while the latter would have the possibility of restoring its power over a
determined territory, the former cannot expect to recover its current territory.")
9. Cf Convention on the Rights and Duties of States Adopted by the Seventh International
Conference of American States, art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Montevideo
Convention] (agreeing that "the state as a person of international law should possess . . . (a) a permanent
population [and] (b) a defined territory").
10. See REPUBLIC OF MALDIVES MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY AND WATER, NATIONAL
ADAPTATION PROGRAM OF ACTION (NAPA) iii (2007), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/mdv0l.pdf
[hereinafter NAPA] (quoting Maldivian President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom as saying that the largest
threat to the Maldives remains global climate change and sea level rise); Worland, supra note 4 (quoting
Kiribati President Anote Tong as saying that the physical islands of Kiribati face grave danger from
climate change). See YAMAMOTO & ESTEBAN, supra note 5, at 35 (discussing broadly the geophysical
effects of climate change on atoll island states).
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This Note argues that both Kiribati and the Maldives will lose the legal status
of statehood because they will no longer fulfill the criteria of the Montevideo
Convention defining elements of a state, specifically due to their lack of a permanent
population able to reside on some defined territory. Part II of this Note begins by
summarizing some of the science on sea level rise, and the prognosis for Kiribati
and the Maldives." Part II then provides an overview and context of the
understanding of "statehood" in international law, specifically referencing the
Montevideo Convention, United Nations (UN) Convention on the Law of the Sea,
and UN Charter.'2 Finally, Part II applies the understanding of statehood to the
current situation facing island nations, and discusses both the UN Trusteeship
system and precedent for non-state sovereign actors." Part III then analyzes the
continuing international relevance of the displaced people of the Maldives and
Kiribati, and predicts that the states will become a new form of post-climate "nation"
as sub-state, sui generis international entities.1 Next, Part III analyzes the UN
Charter and applies UN Trusteeship principles to Kiribati and the Maldives.'s Part
IV discusses what can be done mitigate the effects of climate change in order to save
atoll island states and their people.'" Finally, Part V of this Note concludes that the
likely humanitarian catastrophe caused by rising sea levels will ultimately result in
the loss of statehood for Kiribati and the Maldives."
II. BACKGROUND: THEORIES OF STATEHOOD FOR ATOLL ISLAND
NATIONS
A. The Physical Effects of Climate Change
The earth's climate is changing and higher temperatures bring an increase in
sea level.' It is difficult to accurately project the margin of total sea level rise due
to scientific margin of error, political uncertainty, and the sheer complexity of
climate science.'9 Despite this uncertainty, experts have identified two primary
causes for sea level rise: thermal expansion and melting glaciers.20 Different
projections range from as little as an 18-centimeter rise in sea level up to an almost
200-centimeter rise in average sea level.2' Altogether, an average projection of a
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See infra Part I.C.
14. See infra Part L.A.
15. See infra Part III.B.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part V.
18. Mary-Elena Carr, Madeleine Rubenstein, Alice Graff, & Diego Villarreal, Sea Level Rise in a
Changing Climate: What Do We Know?, in THREATENED ISLAND NATIONS: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF
RISING SEAS AND A CHANGING CLIMATE 15, 15 (Michael B. Gerrard & Gregory Wannier eds., 2013)
[hereinafter Carr].
19. See, e.g., Jason A. Lowe & Jonathan M. Gregory, A Sea of Uncertainty, NATURE REPORTS:
CLIMATE CHANGE (Apr. 6, 2010), http://www.nature.com/climate/2010/1004/fuIl/climate.2010.30.html
(discussing the uncertainty inherent in climate change forecasts).
20. See Carr, supra note 18, at 31.
21. Id. at 32-35.
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100-centimeter ise in sea level "seems unavoidable," while a rise of 200 centimeters
or higher is possible.22
There are few states more vulnerable to rising seas than Kiribati and the
Maldives.23 Both have low average elevations2 4, a majority of their populace in low-
lying areas25, and groundwater aquifers vulnerable to saltwater intrusion.26 A rise in
sea levels would result in massive destruction of vital infrastructure and economic
production.27 Worst case scenario predictions would leave the Maldives entirely
underwater, and the centers of population for Kiribati completely flooded.28 Even if
the Maldives and Kiribati escape complete inundation, they will likely become
uninhabitable due to groundwater salinization.29
Island nations like the Maldives and Kiribati are already among the most
geographically3 0 and socioeconomically vulnerable31 states in the world. This means
that they are pre-positioned to feel the effects of climate change more acutely due to
the lack of economic resources required for an effective response.32 Even if Kiribati
and the Maldives do not disappear completely, they will experience unprecedented
emigration as increasing ecological pressures reduce the habitability of atoll
islands.3 By the year 2100, it is entirely conceivable that "most or all inhabitants [of
small island states] will be forced to migrate."34
22. Id. at 37.
23. See YAMAMOTO & ESTEBAN, supra note 5, at 1 (listing the states most vulnerable to climate
change. Other states include Tuvalu, Nauru, and the Marshall Islands).
24. See Climate Hot Map: Republic of Kiribati, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
http://www.climatehotmap.org/global-warming-locations/republic-of-kiribati.html (last visited Mar. 2,
2016) [hereinafter Climate Hot Map: Kiribati] (stating that most of Kiribati's land area lies less than "a
few feet" above sea level, while the capital, Tarawa, is entirely below three meters above sea level);
Climate Hot Map: Republic of Maldives, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
http://www.climatehotmap.org/global-warming-locations/republic-of-maldives.html (last visited Mar. 2,
2016) [hereinafter Climate Hot Map: Maldives] (stating that no ground surface in the Maldives is above
three meters, and eighty percent of the country's land area is below one meter above sea level).
25. See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK, CITIES, SEAS, AND STORMS: MANAGING CHANGE IN PACIFIC
ISLAND ECONOMIES 19 (2000) (identifying Tarawa, the capital of Kiribati, as housing forty-five percent
of the country's population yet being below an average elevation of three meters above sea level).
26. YAMAMOTO & ESTEBAN, supra note 5, at 40.
27. See, e.g., NAPA, supra note 10, at 23 (noting that the location of critical economic
infrastructure along the coast, including tourist resorts, harbors, international airports, and utilities, makes
it particularly vulnerable to rising sea levels).
28. Compare YAMAMOTO & ESTEBAN, supra note 5, at 39 (stating that a so-called "high" scenario
for sea level rise includes predictions of up to a two-meter rise in sea level), with Climate Hot Map:
Maldives, supra note 24 (stating that the average elevation of the Maldives is less than one meter), and
Climate Hot Map: Kiribati, supra note 24 (stating that the average elevation of Kiribati is less than three
meters).
29. YAMAMOTO & ESTEBAN, supra note 5, at 77-78.
30. SeeNAPA,supranote l0,at i.
31. Carr, supra note 18, at 15 (explaining the need for resources to adapt to the changing climate;
these are resources which many of the poorest island states do not have to invest).
32. Id. at 54.
33. See Park, supra note 3, at 9 ("In any event, the territory would become completely uninhabitable
long before its full disappearance, forcing the population .. . into exile.")
34. MIGRATION, ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE: ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE 396 (Frank
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B. The Definition ofStatehood
To question the future of the island states is to question the definition of
statehood itself." There is no agreed-upon definition of a "state" in international
law.36 This could be explained by the rarity of this question in practice.7 Still, there
are two competing theories of statehood that permeate international law: the
"constitutive" theory3 8 and the "declarative" theory." The declarative theory is
widely accepted as a better analysis for the question of statehood, and is codified by
the Montevideo Convention of 1933.40
1. The Montevideo Convention
The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States stipulates that
a state, as a "person" of international law, must have four qualifications: "(a) a
permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to
enter into relations with other states."4 1 While these criteria are not absolute, they
are intrinsically interlinked with one another.42 For example, even if the territory
were still physically capable of being habitable, if it were not continuously occupied
by the population then it would not meet the Montevideo criteria.43 The
disaggregation of the population and territory would mean that the Montevideo
criteria were no longer fulfilled, even though there remains territory controlled by
the same government responsible for a group of people."
Each of the four Montevideo criteria has been interpreted by international
jurists and scholars.45 A 'defined territory' means some portion of the earth's
Laczko & Christine Aghazam eds., 2009).
35. See GERRARD, supra note 5, at 6 (introducing the questions of sovereignty that arise when
considering the future of these 'sinking' island states).
36. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5 (2d ed. 2006)
[hereinafter CRAWFORD] (discussing theories of statehood and the debate about what constitutes a State).
37. See Disappearing States, supra note 6, at 5-6.
38. See CRAWFORD, supra note 36, at 19-22 (stating that the constitutive theory of statehood holds
that states themselves are responsible for determining which entities may be known as states; in other
words, recognition of an entity by states constitutes the entity's statehood).
39. See id. at 22-26 (stating that the declarative theory is the more generally accepted theory of
statehood, and interprets the question of statehood as an objective test rather than subjecting it to the
political whims of international relations). See also Deutsche Continental Gas Gesellschaft v. Polish
State, 5 I.L.R. 11, 13 (1929) ("The State exists by itself and the recognition is nothing else than a
declaration of this existence, recognized by the States from which it emanates.")
40. See Thomas D. Grant, Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents, 37
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 403,403 (1999) (stating that although there are alternative views, the objective
criteria expressed in the Montevideo Convention remain the most widely accepted theory of statehood).
41. Montevideo Convention, supra note 9, art. I.
42. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Climate Change and Statelessness: An
Overview, Submission dated May 15, 2009 to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative
Action under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (June 1-12, 2009),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4a2dl89d3.html.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2.
45. See Rafaela S. Goncalves da Rosa, Statelessness, Statehood and Climate Change in
252017
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surface, regardless of imprecise boundaries or competing territorial disputes.46
Territory must also be habitable and capable of supporting economic activity.47 The
requirement of a population means that there must be a permanent set of residents
within a given territory.48 However, there is no requisite minimum number of
residents.49 There is only a requirement that a "significant" number of residents be
permanent rather than nomadic."o There has been no direct definition of what counts
as a significant proportion of the population, though there are some states that have
nearly as many nationals living outside their borders as living within them.5
The 'government' criterion is predicated on two factors: the actual exercise of
authority and the right to exercise that authority.52 This requirement is also
intimately connected with the ideas of territory and sovereignty, and is defined in
large part by the nature and extent of control." Finally, the capacity for entering into
relations with other states integrates two other requirements together: independence
and an effective government.54 In fact, some academics and jurists see this criterion
exclusively through the lens of independence, and even name 'independence' as the
"central criterion for statehood."5 Capacity is thus often simply a consequence of
statehood."
2. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
Island state ideas of territory and resources are intimately bound with the sea
that surrounds them. 5 The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) can
International Law: The Case of the Low-lying Islands 11 (June 2013) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, Tilburg
University) (on file with Tilburg University Library) [hereinafter da Rosa] (analyzing the meaning of the
Montevideo criteria); see CRAWFORD, supra note 36, at 45-62 (discussing in detail each of the four
factors, including how they have been interpreted and providing examples of how they have been
applied).
46. da Rosa, supra note 45, at II (citing Philip C. Jessup's argumentation before the U.N. Security
Council regarding admission of Israel to the UN and North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den. & Neth.),
1969 .C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 32 (Feb. 20)).
47. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 121, 1 3, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 ("Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have
no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf."); see also infra Part H.B.2.
48. Disappearing States, supra note 6, at 112.
49. Id.
50. Park, supra note 3, at 5.
51. See, e.g., Disappearing States, supra note 6, at 112-13 (describing the cases of Samoa and
Tonga, which have 56.9% and 46% of nationals residing outside their territory, respectively).
52. CRAWFORD, supra note 36, at 57.
53. Id. at 57-59 (analyzing as an example the new state of the Republic of the Congo in 1960, and
the struggles its nascent government faced in gaining and maintaining control).
54. da Rosa, supra note 45, at 14.
55. See CRAWFORD, supra note 36, at 62 (quoting Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829,
838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928)) ("Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence.").
56. da Rosa, supra note 45, at 14.
57. Cf Latif Nasser, When Island Nations Drown, Who Owns Their Seas?, BOSTON GLOBE (Oct.
19, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/10/18/when-island-nations-drown-who-owns-their-
seas/hyH9W5bImCAyTVgwlFh7qO/story.html (analyzing the question of ownership for island state
exclusive economic zones, and suggesting that the "large and valuable" maritime zones are vital to the
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be a useful lens through which to view questions of territory in an evaluation of
statehood." Importantly, the UNCLOS does not explicitly state whether the low-
water coastline mark created by states is capable of moving.59 What is left to be
determined is whether these baselines can move to the point of extinguishing any
maritime claim at all.60 Some academics6' have proposed simply freezing the
ambulatory baseline at its current point, and thus maintaining current maritime
claims without worrying about future reduction of a state's ability to access its ocean
resources.62
While this solution may allow an island state to continue accessing its maritime
resources, it does not resolve the question of that state's continued existence.6 3
UNCLOS is only open to states; only states under international law may legally
possess maritime zones in the first place.' If an atoll state disappears, the
uninhabitable rocks it leaves behind do not constitute a sufficient claim to the seas
that surround them."s The maritime claims alone are not a sufficient substitute for
the combination of territory, population, and government.66
C. Falling Short of Statehood
If a state at some point does not meet the criteria for statehood, then it can no
longer be considered a state under international law. 6 This Note will (1) apply the
Montevideo criteria to the situation of Kiribati and the Maldives, then (2) describe
non-state sovereign entities, such as indigenous peoples, the Order of Malta, and the
Holy See.
culture and economy of island states).
58. See Rosemary Rayfuse, W(h)ither Tuvalu? International Law and Disappearing States 3 (2009)
(unpublished manuscript, University of New South Wales Research Paper),
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1412028 [hereinafter Rayfuse] (analyzing the continued existence of Tuvalu,
and arguing that freezing the coastal baseline under the UNCLOS can be a way to legally provide for
resources for sinking states).
59. Id. at 3 (discussing academic and textual interpretations of the convention, all of which
conclude that he border must "be ambulatory").
60. Id. at 4 ("The difficulty with the theory of ambulatory baselines [in the context of rising sea
level] is immediately apparent.").
61. See, e.g., David D. Caron, When Law Makes Climate Change Worse: Rethinking the Law of
Baselines in Light ofa Rising Sea Level, 17 ECOLOGY L. Q. 621, 650 (1990); Alfred H. A. Soons, The
Effects of a Rising Sea Level on Maritime Limits and Boundaries, 37(2) NETH. INT'L L. REV. 207, 225
(1990).
62. See Rayfuse, supra note 58, at 5-6.
63. Id. at 6 ("Even assuming a freeze on the outer limits of maritime zones, however, this does not
entirely dispose of maritime zones in the context of disappearing states.").
64. Id.
65. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 47, art. 121, 1 3, ("Rocks which
cannot sustain human habitation ... shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.").
66. See id.
67. Cf Montevideo Convention, supra note 9, art. I (defining a state by its constituent four criteria).
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1. Applying the Montevideo Criteria
The future does not seem promising for Kiribati and the Maldives.6 1 Applying
the elements of a state in international law69 to a "post-climate"70 incarnation of both
Kiribati and the Maldives, neither state will be able to show the presence of habitable
territory or permanent population.7 1
It seems likely that both governments will continue to exist even after territory
is lost or becomes uninhabitable.72 Both Kiribati and the Maldives are actively
making plans for the continuity of their peoples, which implies that the governments
will continue to exist in order to oversee the transition.7 ' Further, the international
presumption of state continuity means that the international community will not seek
to externally extinguish the governments of deterritorialized peoples74 , and the
individual presumption of a desire for power implies that the government will not
dissolve itself.7' Finally, there is a long history of deterritorialized governments, if
not a long history of deterritorialized states recognized under international law. 76
Next, the ability to enter into foreign relations or, alternatively, 'independence,'
presents a slightly more difficult question. Current members of the international
system are assumed to be stable.7 While this does not in itself mean those entities
remain states in fact, it does mean that other states around the world will likely
continue to treat them as international equals." This facet of statehood could be more
complicated depending on the form in which Kiribati and the Maldives elect to
weather the climate storm." If they are housed on the territory of another state in
68. See supra Part II.A (describing the high probability of inundation for both island states).
69. See supra Part 1.B (defining and discussing the Montevideo elements: an effective government,
the ability to enter into international relations, territory, and permanent population).
70. See Maxine A. Burkett, The Nation Ex-Situ, in THREATENED ISLAND NATIONS: LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS OF RISING SEAS AND A CHANGING CLIMATE 89, 92, 107 (Michael B. Gerrard & Gregory
E. Wannier eds., 2013) [hereinafter Burkett] (describing the use of the term "post-climate" as a situation
after disasters precipitated by climate change force a fundamental reorganization for certain societies).
71. See infra Part ll.C.1.
72. See CRAWFORD, supra note 36, at 56-58 (discussing how the requirements for a "government"
under the Montevideo Convention are generally loose and hinge on both the right to govern and the ability
to govern; the assumption of continuity for states implies the continuity of their government).
73. See, e.g., Worland, supra note 4 (discussing plans to provide for the preservation of the state
after inundation from sea level rise). See also NAPA, supra note 10 (detailing plans to deal with the
effects of climate change).
74. CRAWFORD, supra note 36, at 667 (stating that international law is based on the assumption of
state continuity).
75. Cf JAMES LEE RAY, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND POLITICAL AMBITION 35 (2d ed. 2014)
(stating that a primary assumption of political actors is the desire to retain positions of power).
76. See, e.g., YAMAMOTO & ESTEBAN, supra note 5, at 203-06.
77. CRAWFORD, supra note 36, at 667 (discussing the international system with the assumption that
states will continue to recognize governmental entities as states even after declarative factors of statehood
may be absent).
78. See id at 19-26 (identifying issues with the constitutive theory of statehood as opposed to the
declarative theory of statehood).
79. See, e.g., Rosemary Rayfuse & Emily Crawford, Climate Change, Sovereignty and Statehood
10 (Sept. 2011) (unpublished manuscript, University of Sydney Legal Studies Research Paper 11/59),
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1931466 [hereinafter Rayfuse & Crawford] (suggesting multiple alternatives for
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any situation other than outright cessation or purchase of land, then there would be
a level of legal sovereignty that supersedes the displaced governments.so This would
raise difficult questions of sovereignty."
The question of territory is the most referenced issue concerning post-climate
existence of states; the phrase 'modem day Atlantis' summons a striking image.82
Territory is also undeniably intertwined with what it means to be a state.83 Kiribati
has an enviable position among atoll island states: with a high point of above 80
meters on one sparsely inhabited island, the entirety of the state's territory is unlikely
to disappear.84 The Maldives face a much grimmer outlook: with a high point less
than three meters above sea level, rising seas might truly cover it completely.8 5
Ultimately, "a State without a territorial basis, however tiny it may be, is
inconceivable."86
Even if the waves do not completely inundate the territories of Kiribati and the
Maldives, the requirement of population could prove difficult to sustain." In a
situation where the groundwater has been compromised, infrastructure destroyed,
arable land reduced, and economic opportunity lessened, those people who still have
some bit of land might choose to seek a life elsewhere." Without a permanent
population, the territory has no meaning in an analysis of statehood.8 9
Once a current state has lost territory, population, or both, it can no longer be
deemed a state.9 0 For Kiribati and the Maldives, research shows that by the end of
populations escaping climate change, including relocation to the territory of a sovereign state).
80. See id. (assuming that the sovereign entity would cede "some degree" of jurisdictional control
to the deterritorialized nation).
81. See, e.g., Compact of Free Association, U.S.-Palau, Title 3, Art. I, § 312, Jan. 10, 1986, 100
Stat. 3672, https://photos.state.gov/libraries/palau/5/home/rop cofa.pdf (agreeing on a mutual
relationship - a compact of free association - between the United States and the sovereign state of Palau
in order to delegate certain aspects of sovereignty from Palau to the United States, such as military
defense).
82. See, e.g., Disappearing States, supra note 6, at 105 ("Predictions of whole countries
disappearing Atlantis-style beneath the waves raise fascinating legal issues.").
83. See id at 112 (quoting notable international jurist Philip C. Jessup, "There must be some portion
of the earth's surface which [a state's] people inhabit and over which its government exercises
authority."); see also Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 839 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928)
("International law, the structure of which is not based on any super-State organization, cannot be
presumed to reduce a right such as territorial sovereignty, with which almost all international relations
are bound up, to the category of an abstract right, without concrete manifestations.").
84. See Kiribati, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Apr. 4, 2017),
http://www.britannica.com/place/Kiribati (stating that Kiribati's highest point is on Banaba, reaching 87
meters above sea level).
85. Climate Hot Map: Maldives, supra note 24.
86. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 81 (2d ed. 2005).
87. See supra Part II.B.
88. See supra Part II.A.
89. Cf CRAWFORD, supra note 36, at 52 (asserting that if states are territorial, then they must also
be aggregates of individuals).
90. Cf Montevideo Convention, supra note 9, art. I (requiring that an entity have both territory and
population to be termed a "state").
2017 29
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
the century they will likely lose one or both of these key elements of statehood.9 1
2. Non-State Sovereign Entities: Indigenous Peoples, the Order of
Malta, and the Holy See
There are many examples throughout the world of groups of people that had
sovereignty and subsequently lost it; indigenous peoples, such as the Maori and the
Inuit, remain cohesive cultural groups occupying traditional territory, yet lack the
sovereignty of an independent state.92 When the people of Kiribati and the Maldives
lose habitable islands to rising seas, the parallels with indigenous groups will be
striking. Under international law, indigenous peoples have the rights to autonomy,
limited sovereignty, and self-determination.94 Indigenous peoples also have the
explicit right to a nationality.95 Both the Inuit and Maori, as well as other indigenous
nations, can claim some level of sovereignty below that of their respective 'host'
states.96 Indigenous nations show that ideas of national cohesion and autonomy are
important even when the administration is not a state under international law.97
Furthermore, there are also examples of state entities that lost territory, yet were
subsequently granted some measure of sovereignty by the international community;
both the Order of Malta98 and the Holy See99 were at one time sovereign state
entities. The Order of Malta once occupied sovereign territory on the island of Malta
where it constituted the government of the State of Malta.'" Despite existing as an
Order since 1050, it was removed from the island after ceding its territory to
Napoleon in 1798.11 Regardless, it has retained international sovereignty despite no
longer ruling over a true "state."'02 It has been granted observer status at the UN
91. See supra Part II.A.
92. See Rayfuse, supra note 58, at 10-11.
93. Id
94. G.A. Res. 61/295, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/61/295, arts. 3-4 (Oct. 2, 2007).
95. Id art. 6.
96. See id; see also Peter Jull, Building Nunavut: A Story oflnuit Self-Government, 1 NORTHERN
REv. 59 (1988) [hereinafter Jull] (discussing the history of the Inuit negotiations to obtain self-governance
in the northern territories of Canada).
97. G.A. Res. 61/295, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/61/295, arts. 3-6 (Oct. 2, 2007).
98. See generally Achim Maas & Alexander Carius, Territorial Integrity and Sovereignty: Climate
Change and Security, in the Pacific and Beyond, in CLIMATE CHANGE, HUMAN SECURITY AND VIOLENT
CONFLICT 651, 659 (Jilrgen Scheffran et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter Maas & Carius] (describing the
Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order ofSt. John ofJerusalem, ofRhodes, and of Malta- more commonly
known as the Order of Malta - as a precedent for a sovereign entity without territory).
99. YAMAMOTO & ESTEBAN, supra note 5, at 204-05 (analogizing the case of the Holy See from
1870 to 1929 - before the cessation creating the Vatican City - to those of the deterritorialized island
states).
100. Id at 203-04.
101. Rayfuse & Crawford, supra note 79, at 10.
102. Id (stating that the order endures, headquartered in Rome, and is dedicated to the provision of
medical care).
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General Assembly, and is recognized as sovereign by approximately eighty states.103
The Holy See'" is another famous example of a non-state sovereign entity
under international law. Although the Holy See possessed territory, the Papal States,
for much of its early existence, this territory around Rome was annexed by the
Kingdom of Italy in 1870.1s This left the Holy See in a unique position: what had
heretofore been a state, and still controlled vast amounts of money and resources,
was without territory, and yet retained significant international influence as the
Catholic Church.0 6 As a solution to this legal conundrum, the international
community continued to recognize the Holy See after 1870.107 By 1929, the Lateran
Treaties carved out the Vatican City State, a micro-state, to be placed under the
sovereignty of the Holy See.'0
D. The UN Trusteeship System
The international community has already created systems for non-state, yet
national, entities to participate in international politics with states: the trusteeship
system.10 9 The idea of international trusteeship first emerged as part of the League
of Nations' plan to govern colonial territories previously administered by the
German and Ottoman Empires after World War I.' After World War II, the United
Nations evolved the League of Nations' system into an international Trusteeship
Council, governed by Chapters XII and XIII of the UN Charter."' Under the Charter,
the trusteeship system has four overriding goals: (a) furthering international security;
(b) promoting economic and social advancement of entities in trust; (c) promoting
human rights and fundamental freedoms; and (d) ensuring sovereign equality for all
UN member states in social and economic matters.1' Political trustees, typically
103. Id.
104. The Holy See refers to the sovereign, ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Pope and the government
of the Catholic Church. The Vatican City, on the other hand, is the "mini state" which was created by the
Lateran Treaty between the Holy See and Italy. Although related to the Holy See, the Vatican City is in
fact a separate entity whose relationship with the Holy See is complex. See generally Kurt Martens, The
Position of the Holy See and Vatican City State in International Relations, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REv.
729, 730 (2006) [hereinafter Martens] (analyzing the relationship between the two entities as it pertains
to international action).
105. YAMAMOTO & ESTEBAN, supra note 5, at 204.
106. Id.
107. Rayfuse, supra note 58, at 10.
108. Id.; see generally Martens, supra note 104 (discussing highly complex relationship between the
Holy See and the Vatican City, including why the two entities are legally distinct and the status of each
under international law).
109. See, e.g., Henry H. Perritt, Structures and Standards for Political Trusteeship, 8 U.C.L.A. J.
INT'L. L. & FOREIGN AFF. 385, 396-98 (2003) [hereinafter Perritt] (describing the structure of UN
Trusteeship).
110. See Brian Deiwart, Note, A New Trusteeship for World Peace and Security: Can an Old League
ofNations Idea be Applied to a Twenty-First Century Iraq?, 14 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 771, 775-
76 (2004) [hereinafter Deiwart] (discussing the League of Nations mandate system for trusteeship).
111. U.N. Charter arts. 75-91.
112. Id. art. 76 ("a. to further international peace and security; b. to promote the political, economic,
social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants . .. c. to encourage respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms ... d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for
2017 31
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
states administering territory during a post-colonial transition, act in order to hold
the territory "in trust" for the benefit of the nationals of that territory, and must act
in accordance with the principles of the trusteeship system.113
One of the most successful and most recent examples of UN political
trusteeship is the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).11 4
UNMIK held responsibilities in trust for ambiguous beneficiaries, including "future
generations of Kosovars," and left a reversionary interest which was only defined in
subsequent negotiations."s The primary responsibilities of UNMIK included the
following: (1) promoting self-government and the establishment of a new political
entity in Kosovo; (2) overseeing provisional institutions "pending a political
settlement;" (3) facilitating the process of determining the future status of Kosovo;
(4) supporting humanitarian and disaster relief assistance; and (5) maintaining civil
law and order." 6
Although the objects of the system established in 1945 are different from the
current, climate-change induced scenario (i.e., territory), the objectives are highly
applicable to a post-climate situation."7 The UNMIK was tasked with several
objectives that could be easily replicated for a post-climate deterritorialized
nation."' By repurposing the existing international structure, the government of a
deterritorialized nation can retain international relevance to facilitate the support of
its people, despite losing traditional statehood."9
III. ANALYSIS: THE DETERRITORIALIZED "NATION" AS A SUI GENERIS
POLITICAL ENTITY
As a collection of rules made by states for states, international law is not
effectively equipped to address the involuntary extinction of states.2 0 This Note will
(a) analyze the need for Kiribati and the Maldives to continue existing as
deterritorialized nations; (b) discuss why UN Trusteeship is the best option under
existing international law for Kiribati and the Maldives; and (c) show that there is
international precedent for non-state sovereign actors.
A. The Need for "Post-Climate" Sovereign Relevance
When climate change irreparably alters the international order -likely within
the next hundred years - the world will have entered a "post-climate" phase of
all Members of the United Nations and their nationals. .
113. See Perritt, supra note 109, at 389.
114. See id. at 398 ("Kosovo was the zenith for UN-sponsored political trusteeship because this was
the first time that the international community actually exercised sovereignty explicitly from the outset.")
115. See id at 402.
116. See S.C. Res. 1244, Il 11(ak) (June 10, 1999).
117. Burkett, supra note 70, at 108-09.
118. See id. at I10.
119. See id. at 114; see also infra Part II.B.
120. Cf Rayfuse & Crawford, supra note 79, at 5 (distinguishing between dissolution of states and
extinction of states, and noting that "in the history of the UN, there have been almost no incidents of total
extinction" of a state).
32 VOL. 46:1
WHEN THE LEVEE BREAKS
international law.12' For Kiribati and the Maldives, this transition will mean the end
of their status as states under international law.122 However, this Note argues that
both governments will continue to exist as deterritorialized nations due to the needs
facing their populations: (1) the needs of their displaced populations; and (2) the
need to control and regulate remaining maritime resources.
1. Statelessness and the Protection of Climate Change Refugees
Migration and displacement from low-lying islands is already beginning;
climate change will only exacerbate the diaspora of island populations.123 So far, the
displacement is mostly taking place within existing borders of island states.'24
However, in a post-climate scenario many of these ex-states will be completely
uninhabitable.'25 In this situation, the specter of statelessness looms over the
survivors forced to relocate to other states. 126 Individuals displaced by climate
change do not enjoy status as refugees under the current incarnation of the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,127 and as such, their rights would be
entirely dependent on the willingness of a host state to grant some durable legal
status. 128
The continuity of governments of displaced nations129 would provide a level of
stability and international governance for dislocated people.30 Nationality, as a
concept under international law, has broadened significantly from its initial form of
121. See Burkett, supra note 70, at 107 (defining the term "post-climate" and discussing the possible
situation of a "post-climate" world for the Republic of the Marshall Islands).
122. See supra Part II.C.
123. See Park, supra note 3, at 5 (discussing examples where islands have been abandoned by
peoples, such as in Papua New Guinea where three different communities have already needed to be
relocated within the state in order to avoid being inundated with seawater as a result of climate change).
124. Id.
125. See supra Part H.A-C.
126. See, e.g., YAMAMOTO & ESTEBAN, supra note 5, at 254 (analyzing the process by which
individuals displaced from islands as a result of climate change would be rendered stateless under the
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Person when their former state dissolved).
127. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(A)(2), July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
150 (defining a 'refugee' as a person that (1) has a "well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion," (2) "is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country," and (3) "who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return
to it."). See generally Jane McAdam, Climate Change Displacement and International Law
Complementary Protection Standards, UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, U.N. Doc.
PPLA/2011/03 (May 2011) [hereinafter Climate Change Displacement] (analyzing the Refugee
Convention in light of the possibility of climate change refugees).
128. Park, supra note 3, at 16.
129. In the post-climate scenario, I will use the word "nation" to refer collectively to the people who
were residents of a state that has ceased to exist due to climate change. The nation's government is the
entity that used to be a state, but has been reduced due to lack of territory/population, as discussed in
supra Part 11.
130. See YAMAMOTO & ESTEBAN, supra note 5, at 261 (discussing the need for continuity in
nationality for the populations of small island states in order to avoid statelessness).
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a state's control of its citizens to a norm of international law.' ' In fact, under a
modem interpretation of nationality, it is not solely up to traditional states to
determine nationality.'32 By continuing to exist, the governments of Kiribati and the
Maldives will fulfill this right to a nationality.133 Although questions remain as to
the extent of their sovereignty, the peoples of the Maldives and Kiribati will continue
to have needs that need to be addressed.
2. Protection of a Nation's Resources and Culture
A second reason for the governments of displaced nations to continue to exist
is the need for some kind of structure to manage the cultural and physical resources
left behind by the dissolving state.'34 This authority would be able to act as a trustee
of these resources for the benefits of the nation of people, regardless of their final
location.' Essentially, a form of international trusteeship can serve as an example
for newly deterritorialized nations.' 3 6 Although the purpose of historical trusteeship
arrangements was focused on territory in a postcolonial context,13 7 the structure and
lessons of the UN and League of Nations system are applicable because they provide
a level of international oversight and legitimacy for deterritorialized nations.138 The
international oversight of the UN Security Council or General Assembly will help
facilitate international cooperation regarding the resettlement of the disappeared
state's people, the persistence of the nation's culture, and the judicious use of the
remaining maritime resources.'3 9
13 1. Compare Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law art. 1,
Apr. 13, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89 ("It is for each State to determine under its own law who are its
nationals."), with Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 23 (Apr. 6)
("[NJationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of
existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties.").
132. See Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica,
Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶J 32-34 (Jan. 19, 1984) (considering that although
traditional international law leaves nationality up to individual States, "contemporary developments" in
international law - a movement towards more international governance, limitations on State power and
limitations on unimpeachable sovereignty - imply that "matters bearing on nationality cannot today be
deemed to be within [a State's] sole jurisdiction.").
133. See YAMAMOTO & ESTEBAN, supra note 5, at 258-59 (implying that without redefining the
international conventions on statelessness, only the presence of an international actor can prevent
statelessness for displaced island nations).
134. See, e.g., Rayfuse, supra note 58, at 11 (suggesting that an "authority" would be needed in order
to continue to manage maritime resources left behind in the territory of the sunken island State).
135. See id. (reasoning that the government of a deterritorialized state could continue to support its
people through use of remaining resources).
136. See, e.g., Perritt, supra note 109, at 389 (discussing trusteeship arrangements under the League
of Nations and United Nations, and defining a trusteeship arrangement as one which is holding resources
and territory for the benefit of a set of people).
137. See id at 396 (stating that the UN trusteeship system focused on postcolonial territorial
transitions).
138. See Burkett, supra note 70, at 109 (suggesting a trusteeship as a possible method of continuity
for island nations).
139. See, e.g., U.N. Charter arts. 86-87 (discussing the oversight structure of the trusteeship
arrangement); see also Rayfuse & Crawford, supra note 79, at 12 (suggesting reasons behind a modern
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Kiribati and the Maldives each have large maritime claims, which present both
a source of possible disputes as well as a source of income for the subsequently
disbursed nation.'40 Many scholars have proposed an agreement o freeze existing
baselines under the UNCLOS in order to preserve resources for the dissolved states
and prevent conflict over resources by neighboring, surviving states.141 In particular,
the maritime resources left behind by the disappeared states provide an incentive for
the government to continue to act on behalf of its people, and the income from these
resources can provide much needed economic resources.142 For example, Kiribatil 43
and the Maldives'" each have extensive exclusive economic zones. Freezing the
current coastal boundaries would have a substantial impact on the availability of
future resources for Kiribati and the Maldives, and would help provide a continuing
justification for the continuity of their governments in the form of deterritorialized
nations.145
B. Principles ofInternational Trusteeship Can Assist in the Transition to a
Deterritorialized Nation for Kiribati and the Maldives
The best way to preserve elements associated with state sovereignty for a
deterritorialized nation is to revive the political trusteeship model popular for
postcolonial territories throughout the 20th century.'46 The United Nations enshrined
a system of political trusteeship in the UN Charter after World War II, attempting to
ensure peace and security in territories transitioning through the procedures of self-
determination towards self-government. 14 Specifically, territories imagined by the
UN Charter as being eligible for trusteeship include: (a) trust territories under
application of the UN trusteeship system, including "to provide social, cultural, political, and economic
support and guidance for a people forced to abandon their lands.").
140. See Rayfuse, supra note 58, at 11-12 (illustrating that the preserved maritime zones require
some entity to control them).
141. See supra Part II.B.2 for more detail on this proposal.
142. Rayfuse, supra note 58, at 11-12.
143. Exclusive Economic Zones. How Some Countries are a Lot Larger Than They Appear,
BASEMENT GEOGRAPHER (Mar. 10, 2011), http://basementgeographer.com/exclusive-economic-zones-
how-some-countries-are-a-lot-larger-than-they-appear/ (stating that despite having only 811 square
kilometers of land area spread across 33 islands, Kiribati actually has the twelfth-largest exclusive
economic zone in the world - 3,441,810 square kilometers - due to the dispersion of its currently habitable
territory.).
144. Maldives, BAY OF BENGAL PROGRAMME, http://bobpigo.org/text-7-Maldives.html (last
accessed Mar. 4, 2016) (identifying that the Maldives has only 298 square kilometers of land area, yet
claims 916,189 square kilometers of maritime exclusive economic zone territory).
145. See Rayfuse, supra note 58, at 11 (implying that resource governance would be a vital task for
an authority to continue to exist on behalf of the deterritorialized nations).
146. See, e.g., Burkett, supra note 70, at 107 ("The political trusteeship system provides a helpful
model for how to govern a nation without a habitable territory."); see also Rayfuse, supra note 58, at 11
(suggesting that some kind of "authority" was needed to continue to manage maritime resource zones on
behalf of the deterritorialized population).
147. See Perritt, supra note 109, at 71; accordDeiwert, supra note 110, at 778 (discussing the intent
behind incorporating League of Nations principles into the UN Charter regarding trusteeship at the San
Francisco Conference in 1945); see also supra Part II.D (addressing the principles of the UN Trusteeship
system).
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international control through the League of Nations "mandate" system;14 (b) areas
removed from control of Germany and Japan at the end of World War II; and (c)
post-colonial territories placed into the UN system by their colonial sovereigns in
order to facilitate transition.14 9 This is a very general and ambiguous framework by
which to create a legal system.50 The third category, in particular, while clearly
contemplating colonial territories placed into the system as a process towards
achieving independence, contains language sufficiently broad to contemplate
including many modem states as subjects of trusteeship.'"' Ultimately, the goals of
trusteeship were those of a "civilizing mission:" promoting the evolution of the
entity to the point that trusteeship was no longer necessary to support the entity being
held in trust.52
The broad language of the UN Charter is key to applying trusteeship principles
to small island states like Kiribati and the Maldives.'53 Further, the objectives and
purposes stated by the UN Charter will also be furthered by extending the umbrella
of trusteeship to cover states like Kiribati and the Maldives. 154 The key difference
for the modern context of climate change induced trusteeship is the requirement of
sovereignty; the UN system traditionally excluded territories that had become
Member States, consistent with the principle of sovereign equality.Is In order to re-
think the system and apply it to the modern context, the principle of sovereign
equality remains relevant; however, it is the trusteeship system that becomes the
vehicle for recognition of the deterritorialized entities as sovereign entities rather
than proof of their inferiority.'56 In other words, the trusteeship system is a way to
ensure continued relevance and sovereign respect for Kiribati and the Maldives
within the international system. 'I
The climate-induced trusteeship arrangement could take the form of a UN
148. See Perritt, supra note 109, at 393 (analyzing the old League of Nations "mandate" system for
international trusteeship and comparing it to the modem UN system).
149. U.N. Charter art. 77, fl ("(a) territories now held under mandate; (b) territories which may be
detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War; and (c) territories voluntarily placed
under the system by states responsible for their administration.").
150. See Perritt, supra note 109, at 397-98.
151. See id (suggesting that states being administered by other states could be included here,
whether or not such administration was authorized by the Security Council, and expressly proposing
situations such as those in Afghanistan, East Timor, and Iraq).
152. See Ralph Wilde, From Trusteeship to Self-Determination and Back Again: The Role of The
Hague Regulations in the Evolution ofInternational Trusteeship, and the Framework ofRight and Duties
ofOccupying Powers, 31 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 85, 103 (2009) [hereinafter From Trusteeship
to Self-Determination and Back Again] (describing the "twin objectives of trusteeship" as care and
improvement of the territory held in trust by the international community.); see also YAMAMOTO &
ESTEBAN, supra note 5, at 206-07 (analyzing Ralph Wilde's assertion of the "civilizing mission" in
reference to the modified trusteeship proposed for disappearing atoll island states).
153. See, e.g., Burkett, supra note 70, at 108-09.
154. See U.N. Charter art. 76 (stating four primary purposes of the trusteeship system; quoted supra
note 97).
155. U.N. Charter art. 78.
156. See Burkett, supra note 70, at 109.
157. See id
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interim mission, much like traditional forms of UN trusteeship.'` The most recent
and most successful example of a UN trusteeship arrangement was in Kosovo in
1999.'"1 This was a political arrangement by which the United Nations appointed an
administration to run the affairs of a national political entity. 160 Similarly, the UN
Trusteeship Council could also provide for a transitional mechanism for Kiribati and
the Maldives.1' While the transition to a purely deterritorialized entity is a novel
concept under international law, it is a similar process to that of a newly independent
territory.62 For example, each of the responsibilities outlined in the Security Council
resolution establishing UNMIK' 6 has parallel applicability to the situation for
Kiribati and the Maldives, and presents an apt analytical comparison given the lack
of precedent for deterritorialized nations.
First, promoting self-government and the establishment of a new political entity
would be a vital concern to the deterritorialized governments seeking to ensure
continuity in whatever physical location they are able to inhabit. This could manifest
itself by altering the structure of current political and economic institutions.'
Second, overseeing provisional institutions "pending a political settlement" will be
equally important for addressing concerns about continued citizenship and the
change in circumstances for I-Kiribati or Maldivian citizens.'65 Third, "facilitating a
political process"'6 6 for determining the future status of the Maldives and Kiribati
will be of paramount importance in international relations, particularly in
determining a method by which I-Kiribati or Maldivian citizens are represented
diplomatically abroad.6 1
Fourth, supporting humanitarian and disaster relief assistance, and equitably
and effectively distributing money and other resources, is equally important in a
158. See Burkett, supra note 70, at 110; Cf Perritt, supra note 109, at 401-02 (analyzing the UN
Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which was the trustee over the territory and people of Kosovo and
held title to the property of the future state with the people as beneficiaries; the trusteeship system in
Kosovo also contemplated 'ambiguous' beneficiaries such as 'future generations' of Kosovars.).
159. See Perritt, supra note 109, at 401-02.
160. See S.C. Res. 1244, 1 6 (June 10, 1999) (authorizing the Secretary General to appoint a
representative to head a civil administration of Kosovo). See also supra, Part II.D (describing UNMIK
and its objectives).
161. See, e.g., Burkett, supra note 70, at 111 (suggesting the possibility of an Interim Mission for
the Republic of the Marshall Islands in order to assist in a climate change induced transition to a
deterritorialized state).
162. Id.
163. See S.C. Res. 1244, 11 l(a)--k) (June 10, 1999) (establishing the primary responsibilities of the
international civil presence as including (1) promoting self-government, (2) overseeing provision
institutions, (3) facilitating a transitional process, (4) supporting humanitarian relief, and (5) maintaining
civil law and order).
164. Cf Perritt, supra note 109, at 421-22 (noting that a trustee requires plenary authority to act as
a governing regime, and often must change political and economic institutions in order to facilitate a
transition).
165. Burkett, supra note 70, at 111.
166. S.C. Res. 1244, ¶ 11(e) (June 10, 1999) ("Facilitating a political process designed to determine
Kosovo's future status. .").
167. Rayfuse, supra note 58, at 11.
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mass migration context as it is in a post-conflict territory.1 68 Finally, maintaining
civil law and order is important to resolve intra-nation legal disputes regarding
property and concerns with the transition.16 1 Of these, the most significant challenge
for the interim mission would be the dual task of (a) ensuring diplomatic protection
for nationals living in various states, and (b) negotiating relocation efforts for those
nationals still seeking a new home.7 0
Under the trusteeship system, the governments of Kiribati and the Maldives
will be able to engage with the UN Mission in a process of evaluation and
amendment."' This will allow for the Trusteeship Agreement to be a living
document, changing as the needs of the nation change throughout the transition to
deterritorialized nation status.'72 Ultimately, the trusteeship agreement will have to
be one with a predetermined endpoint in order to underscore the transitional nature
of the arrangement." By making the agreement temporary, it signals to the
international community the need for change in the legal system to accept the new,
deterritorialized nation.'74 The UN trusteeship system was never meant to be a
permanent replacement of sovereign and local governments; rather, it is a
transitional authority lending legitimacy to new - or in this case, drastically changed
- international entities.7"
C. International Law Precedent for Non-State Sovereign Entities Proves the
Needfor a New Trusteeship System
Although the international system is populated by sovereign, territorialized
state entities, and traditional international law asserts that such states are the primary
168. See Vikram Kolmannskog, Climate of Displacement, Climate for Protection?, DANISH
INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 6 (Dec. 2008),
http://www.glogov.org/images/doc/NRCVikramKolmannskog.pdf (contemplating compensation from
developed states through legal action as well as humanitarian assistance for resettlement and adaptation);
Rayfuse, supra note 58, at 11-12 (discussing the distribution of remaining maritime resources as a
substantial source of income for deterritorialized entities).
169. Burkett, supra note 70, at 111 (citing Perritt, supra note 109, at 421).
170. See MCADAM, supra note 6, at II (comparing the situation of a deterritorialized nation to that
of a government in exile, and remarking on the vital need for diplomatic continuity).
171. See U.N. Charter art. 79 ("The terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the
trusteeship system, including any alteration or amendment, shall be agreed upon by the states directly
concerned, including the mandatory power in the case of territories held under mandate by a Member of
the United Nations.")
172. Burkett, supra note 70, at 112.
173. Rayfuse, supra note 58, at 13 (suggesting that an "authority" set up to govern the transitional
deterritorialized state would last between one generation, about 30 years, to one human lifetime, about
100 years); contra Burkett, supra note 70, at I13 (suggesting that the trusteeship arrangement would be
permanent, and explicitly disagreeing with Rayfuse by stating that only a permanent trusteeship
arrangement can guarantee necessary sovereignty).
174. See Rayfuse, supra note 58, at 13 (relating the need for temporal restrictions on trusteeship to
the fact that international law will "have to be reconsidered and configured" to reflect the changing nature
of the international system).
175. See U.N. Charter art. 76, 1 (b) (promoting trust entities' development towards self-governance
and independence); Perritt, supra note 109, at 396 (stating that the trustee has the responsibility to
promote movement towards self-governance and the extinguishment of the trusteeship).
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subjects of and makers of international law, there is precedent in traditional
international law for the deterritorialized sovereign entity.'7 1 In particular, the cases
of the Order of Malta'77 , the Holy See 78 , and indigenous nations17 9 are instructive
examples when considering how a non-state sovereign entity can operate in the
international system. These examples will show the stark differences between past
non-state sovereign actors and the needs of a post-state deterritorialized nation like
Kiribati or the Maldives.
1. Non-State Governments: The Sovereign Order of Malta and the
Holy See (1870-1929)
The Order of Malta is one of the most famous examples of a deterritorialized
sovereign entity.i' The Order of Malta, as evidenced by the name, once occupied
sovereign territory on the island of Malta where it constituted the government of the
State of Malta.'"' It has retained international relevance and sovereignty despite no
longer being a true "state" since 1798.182 All of the Order's land and buildings, such
as its headquarters, outbuildings, and embassy buildings, have been granted
extraterritoriality.'" Furthermore, while the Order is not a state, it has nonetheless
been granted observer status at the UN General Assembly and approximately eighty
states recognize it as a sovereign entity.'84 The Order of Malta retains this
international relevance due to its unique mission; similar to the International
Committee of the Red Cross, another sovereign international entity, the Order of
Malta can pursue humanitarian work without being seen as unduly associated with
any particular state.' It is a sovereign entity in order to preserve its impartiality, as
176. See, e.g., Rayfuse, supra note 58, at 10-11 (citing examples of deterritorialized entities such as
the Order of Malta and the Holy See, as well as referencing nations of indigenous peoples such as the
Maori in New Zealand and the Inuit in Canada and the United States, which enjoy certain exemptions
from the sovereignty of the surrounding state).
177. See Maas & Carius, supra note 98, at 659 (describing the Order of Malta as a precedent for a
sovereign entity without territory).
178. See YAMAMOTO & ESTEBAN, supra note 5, at 204-05 (analogizing the case of the Holy See
from 1870 to 1929 - before the cessation creating the Vatican City - to those of the deterritorialized island
states).
179. See Rayfuse, supra note 58, at 10-11 (suggesting that the circumstances of indigenous nations
are analogous to deterritorialized international entities).
180. See, e.g., YAMAMOTO & ESTEBAN, supra note 5, at 203 (introducing the Order of Malta in the
context of a discussion about deterritorialized states in history).
181. Id. at 203-04.
182. Rayfuse & Crawford, supra note 79, at 10 (stating that the order endures, headquartered in
Rome, and is dedicated to the provision of medical care).
183. See id. (using as examples of buildings granted extraterritoriality the Palazzo Malta in Rome,
the residence of the grand master and location of government bodies, Fort Saint Angel, a building located
on the island of Malta, and the Embassies of the Order to both Italy and the Holy See). See generally
About the Order of Malta, SOVEREIGN ORD. OF MALTA (last visited Sept. 29, 2017),
https://www.orderofmalta.int/sovereign-order-of-malta/ (providing more background information as to
the status of the order and the humanitarian activities the order undertakes; the official website of the
Order of Malta).
184. Rayfuse & Crawford, supra note 79, at 11.
185. See CRAWFORD, supra note 6, at 231-32 (quoting a 1953 Papal Tribunal report on the status of
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opposed to a sovereign entity due to its status as an ex-state.'16
The Holy See is another famous example of a deterritorialized sovereign entity
under international law. Since 1929, the Holy See has had a territorial counterpart in
the Vatican City; however, due to the complex relationship between the Holy See
and the Vatican City, the debate over the legal status of each entity is neither settled
nor satisfied in the legal community.' In fact, the international position of the Holy
See has always been "independent of its territorial competence" due to the Pope's
position at the head of the Catholic Church.' Still, it is instructive to consider the
comparisons with deterritorialized island nations because of the well-known status
of the Holy See as a non-state sovereign entity.
Despite the precedent that both the Order of Malta and the Holy See provide
for the concept of a deterritorialized sovereign legal entity, neither fully
encompasses the complexity of the situation facing a small island state losing
sovereignty.' The Order of Malta retained international sovereignty for the sole
purpose of its humanitarian work, whereas a deterritorialized nation would
necessarily operate on a much broader scale.'90 Similarly, the Holy See only retained
international sovereignty due to its extremely unique position as representing the
powerful Catholic Church.191 Neither Kiribati nor the Maldives has an analogous
single purpose, and to provide for their peoples, both would need to exercise control
over a broad range of objectives.'92
2. The Nations of Indigenous Peoples
In addition to deterritorialized international entities, the legal community also
recognizes the concept of "non-territorial sovereignty;" for example, indigenous
nations like the Maori and the Inuit can claim certain levels of sovereignty despite
being more broadly subject to the laws of the state in which they are located.' In
both of these instances, agreements between the indigenous nation and the territorial
state have managed to carve out a virtual enclave.94 In Canada, local politics
actually resulted in the creation of an Inuit province: Nunavut. Created in 1999,
Nunavut was the result of lengthy negotiations between Inuit leaders and the federal
the Order of Malta as saying that the Order's sovereignty "is functional, that is to say, intended to assure
the fulfilment of the scope of activities of the Order").
186. Id. at 232.
187. YAMAMOTO & ESTEBAN, supra note 5, at 204-05 (describing how different legal thinkers
classify either or both of these entities as a State, a sui generis entity comparable to the Order of Malta,
or some kind of "other entity").
188. CRAWFORD, supra note 6, at226.
189. See supra Part IIL.A.
190. See CRAWFORD, supra note 6, at 232-33.
191. See id. at 226.
192. Cf id. at 197 (suggesting that there are certain "special cases" of sovereignty to which the Order
of Malta and the Holy See belong; these special cases exist outside the bounds of traditional international
law whereas deterritorialized nations would seek act as States within it).
193. Rayfuse, supra note 58, at 10-11.
194. Id. at 11.
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government.'9 5 Even though the success of gaining an entire territory for self-
governance is an outlier for indigenous communities, international law more broadly
recognizes the sovereignty of indigenous peoples.'9 ' Specifically, Article 5 of the
UN Convention on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples affirms that they "have the right
to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social, and
cultural institutions." 97 Thus, a certain level of independence is preserved despite
the inability of the indigenous entity to fully govern within its own land.198
Although indigenous peoples like the Maori and the Inuit do present certain
parallels with the deterritorialized nations of the I-Kiribati and Maldivians,
ultimately the differences outweigh the similarities. While indigenous communities
still reside on their ancestral land despite having lost full sovereignty over it, the I-
Kiribati and Maldivians will be displaced from their islands. '9 For the Maori and
the Inuit, their sovereignty hinges on bilateral relations with their surrounding state
- New Zealand and Canada, respectively - rather than on international
acceptance.20 With Kiribati and the Maldives, the transition from a fully-accepted
state to a newly-deterritorialized nation will require some level of international
stability; acceptance on this level is best provided by the UN Trusteeship system
because it allows the international community to legitimize the deterritorialized
nation rather than address only the symptoms by providing for climate change
refugees.201
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: IS IT TOO LATE TO ACT?
The ultimate effects of climate change on the oceans - sea level rise, increased
acidity, saline intrusion into groundwater, increased ferocity and frequency of
tropical storms - may now be unavoidable.2 02 However dire this may seem for the
territory and people of current small island states, there is still time to act to mitigate
the impact of sea level rise. There are four paths of action, in particular, that the
international community can take to prevent or ameliorate the plight of small island
residents and small island governments facing climate change and potential loss of
statehood. The first two address legitimacy and sovereignty issues for the state
themselves, whereas the second two merely address the impending humanitarian
195. Jonathan D. Greenberg, The Artic World Environmental History, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
1307, 1310 (2009). See Jull, Building Nunavut, supra note 96, at 62-68 (discussing the history of the
Inuit negotiations to obtain self-governance in the northern territories of Canada).
196. See G.A. Res. 61/295, annex, U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, arts. 4-5
(Sept. 13, 2007) (affirming the rights of self-determination and autonomy for indigenous communities).
197. Id. art. 5.
198. Burkett, supra note 70, at 98.
199. Compare Jull, supra note 96, at 59-60, with Climate Change Secretariat, U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Climate Change: Small Island Developing States, 21 (2005),
http://unfecc.int/resource/docs/publications/cc sids.pdf [hereinafter Climate Change] (discussing the
impacts of climate change on the most vulnerable states, including Kiribati and the Maldives).
200. See Rayfuse, supra note 58, at 10-11.
201. See Burkett, supra note 70, at 107-114; see also supra Section III.B (analyzing the UN
Trusteeship system as it applies to Kiribati and the Maldives).
202. Carr, supra note 18, at 53-54.
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refugee crisis. In order of likely effectiveness, the four options are the following: (1)
sign a comprehensive international agreement on the status of states endangered by
climate change;2 03 (2) explicitly incorporate states endangered by climate change
into the mission of the UN Trusteeship Council;2 " (3) support bilateral agreements
between endangered states and safer nearby states;205 and (4) amend the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees to include people displaced by
climate change under the definition of a "refugee."20
First, one of the only ways to create a truly binding regime in international law
is to sign a multilateral treaty.207 By signing such an agreement, perhaps an
"International Convention on the Existential Status of States Endangered by Climate
Change," the international community can lay to rest some of the academic
speculation and confusion that surrounds the issues of a 'modem Atlantis.' 208 This
agreement would have to include agreements on the legal status of the governments
of the disappeared states, pathways to saving the residents of sinking islands,
concerns about preserving the maritime claims and resources of the disappeared
states, and enforcement provisions to force the richer and more powerful states to
help the sinking island residents.2 09 Although such a convention would be politically
difficult to achieve, it would be by far the strongest statement of support that the
international community could send to those endangered by rising oceans.210
If a binding multilateral instrument on the status of states endangered by
climate change proves impossible, then the UN Trusteeship Council should take
responsibility for the transition of endangered states.2 1' There would be a need for
international legitimacy for the newly deterritorialized entities in a post-climate
scenario.21 2 In light of this, one of the best options for international legitimacy
outside of a new treaty or convention is the UN trusteeship system.213 The system
has a history of practiced transitional assistance, having instituted missions in post-
203. See Jane McAdam, Environmental Migration Governance 27 (2009) (unpublished manuscript,
University of New South Wales Research Paper) (suggesting five "action lines" for a coordinated strategy
to deal with the effects of climate change, including improving international legislation and creating a
framework to recognize the environmental, social, and economic aspects of the issue).
204. Burkett, supra note 70, at 107-114.
205. See, e.g., Rayfuse, supra note 58, at 12 (identifying examples of bilateral negotiations between
Tuvalu and Australia in October 2008 on the possibility of relocating Tuvalu's entire population to
Australia in the event of a climate catastrophe).
206. See Climate Change Displacement, supra note 127, at 55 (proposing the possibility of a
protocol added to the Refugee Convention in order to give 'climate refugees' legal status and resettlement
solutions).
207. See, e.g., Statute of the I.C.J., art. 38, ¶ 1 (listing international conventions as a primary source
of international law for the court).
208. See, e.g., Climate Change Displacement, supra note 127, at 55 (discussing the possibility of a
new convention to deal with the effects of climate change displacement).
209. Id
210. Id at 56 (describing the pragmatic difficulties and compromises that would surround the
signing of a new international convention to deal with the impacts of climate change).
211. See supra Part Il.
212. See, e.g., Rayfuse, supra note 58, at 11.
213. See Burkett, supra note 70, at 114.
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colonial and newly self-determined political entities like Kosovo.2 14 By creating
trusteeship missions to oversee the transition for deterritorialized nations like
Kiribati and the Maldives, the UN Trusteeship Council can stabilize international
legitimacy for the new, sui generis nations.2 15
If the Trusteeship Council proves politically unwilling to undertake transitional
responsibility for small island states, the third option for endangered states is to
negotiate bilateral agreements on the future of their communities.216 This is a process
which has already begun for many states threatened by climate change.2 17 While this
does not have the precedential force of a multilateral treaty, it is a way for
governments to assure their peoples' future in a safe and legal manner. 21 This will
also allow the host state to negotiate issues of sovereignty and control with the
government of the deterritorialized nation. Despite the many concerns with an en
masse relocation of an entire nation, this option will likely combine the most
effective and pragmatic solutions for both Kiribati and the Maldives.219
If there is no other solution through either bilateral or multilateral negotiations,
then the multilateral community must at least amend the Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees to enable those displaced by climate change to obtain refugee
status and legal status in states around the globe.220 By allowing those displaced from
their homes to claim refugee status, it will ensure that the displaced nation can at the
very least continue to live legally in a host nation.221
V. CONCLUSION
After the waves wash over the abandoned territory of Kiribati and the Maldives,
the international community will be able to reflect on the durability and
sustainability of not only international environmental law, but also the system of
statehood in international law itself. Kiribati and the Maldives will cease to be states,
but will re-join the international community as sui generis deterritorialized nations,
governing their peoples without the level of sovereignty associated with statehood.
The overwhelming need for some kind of governmental structure to persist and
oversee the transition for the Maldivian and I-Kiribati nations will ensure the
existence of their governments, but the application of the traditional principles of
statehood will prevent those governments from exercising full sovereignty as states
in the international system.
Instead, the UN trusteeship system can provide structure and international
legitimacy for Kiribati and the Maldives. Although there is precedent in the
international system for non-state sovereign actors - such as indigenous
214. See Perritt, supra note 109, at 402-03 (describing the UN Mission in Kosovo as "the best
example of a political trusteeship.").
215. See, e.g., Burkett, supra note 70, at 113-14.
216. See Rayfuse, supra note 58, at 12.
217. See Climate Change Displacement, supra note 127, at 58.
218. Id at 58-59 (asking fundamental questions about the viability of a bilateral relocation program,
confirming the need for some kind of agreement framework in the event that relocation is necessary).
219. Id.
220. See id. at 55.
221. Park, supra note 3, at 13.
2017 43
44 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y VOL. 46:1
communities, the Holy See, and the Order of Malta - each of these differs drastically
from the situation of a state facing extinction. In contrast, the experience of the UN
Interim Mission in Kosovo can serve as an example of how an international
administrative mission can assist in times of transition and lend legitimacy to
unstable international situations.
This Note recommends that the international community take action now to
prevent the catastrophic legal effects of climate change on small island states like
Kiribati and the Maldives. This can be achieved through either a new international
convention or through international recognition of trusteeship principles for post-
climate states. Furthermore, if neither option is feasible, the international community
should take steps to ameliorate the condition of climate change refugees from
Kiribati and the Maldives. This can be done by supporting bilateral relocation
agreements with non-threatened states, or even by amending the Refugee
Convention to allow for the legal existence of climate change refugees.
Climate change is causing rising seas around the globe, with unprecedented
impacts on the natural world. The international community should act now to save
its most vulnerable members from legal and physical extinction.
